IM2010: Operations Research Game Theory: Static Games (Part 1) (Chapter 14 and Gibbons (1992))

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The beginning of game theory

- So far we have focused on decision making problems with only one decision maker.
- Game theory provides a rigorous framework for analyzing multi-player decision making problems.
- ▶ While it has been implicitly discussed in Economics for more than 200 years, game theory is established as a field in 1934.
 - ▶ In 1934, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published a book *Theory of games and economic behaviors*.
- Since then, game theory has been widely studied, applied, and discussed in mathematics, economics, operations research, industrial engineering, and computer science.
 - Actually almost all fields of social sciences and business have game theory involved in.
 - ▶ The Nobel Prizes in economic sciences have been honored to game theorists in 1994, 1996, 2001, 2007, and 2012.

Operations Research, Spring 2013 - Game Theory: Static Games (Part 1)

Road map

► Introduction.

- ▶ Nash equilibrium.
- ▶ Retailer competitions.

Prisoners' dilemma: story

- ► A and B broke into a grocery store and stole some money. Before police officers caught them, they hided those money carefully without leaving any evidence. However, a monitor got their images when they broke the window.
- ► They were kept in two separated rooms. Each of them were offered two choices: **Denial or confession**.
 - ▶ If both of them deny the fact of stealing money, they will both get one month in prison.
 - ▶ If one of them confesses while the other one denies, the former will be set free while the latter will get nine months in prison.
 - ▶ If both confesses, they will both get six months in prison.
- ► They **cannot communicate** and they must make their choices **simultaneously**.
- ▶ What will they do?

Prisoners' dilemma: matrix representation

▶ We may use the following matrix to summarize this "game":

	Denial	Confession
Denial	-1, -1	-9,0
Confession	0, -9	-6, -6

- There are two **players**, player 1 chooses actions in rows and player 2 chooses actions in columns.
- For each combination of actions, the two numbers are the **payoffs** of the two players under their actions: the first for player 1 and the second for player 2.
- ▶ E.g., if both prisoners deny, they will both get one month in prison, which is represented by a payoff of -1.
- ▶ E.g., if prisoner 1 denies and prisoner 2 confesses, prisoner 1 will get 0 month in prison (and thus a payoff 0) and prisoner 2 will get 9 months in prison (and thus a payoff −9).

Prisoners' dilemma: solution

	Denial	Confession
Denial	-1, -1	-9,0
Confession	0, -9	-6, -6

Prisoner 1 thinks:

- "If he denies, I should confess."
- "If he confesses, I should still confess."
- "I see! I should confess anyway!"
- ▶ For prisoner 2, the situation is the same and he will also **confess**.
- ► The <u>solution</u> of this game, i.e., the **outcome**, is that both prisoner will confess.
 - ► This is people's **prediction** of this game.
- ▶ This outcome can be "improved" if they can **cooperate**.

Prisoners' dilemma: discussions

- ► A game like the prisoners' dilemma in which all players choose their actions **simultaneously** is called a **static game**.
- ▶ This question (with a different story) was first formally raised by Professor Tucker (one of the names in the KKT condition) in a seminar.
- ▶ In this game, confession is said to be a **dominant strategy**.
- ► It illustrates that lack of coordination can result in a lose-lose outcome.
 - This situation is termed as **socially inefficient**.
- Interestingly, even if they promised each other to deny once they are caught, this promise is **non-credible**. Both of them will still confess to maximize their payoffs.

Prisoners' dilemma: Advertising game

- Two companies are competing in a market.
- ▶ At this moment, they both earn four million dollars per year.
- Each of them may choose to advertise with a cost of three million per year:
 - ▶ If one advertises while the other does not, she earns nine millions and the competitor earns one million.
 - ▶ If both advertise, both will earn six millions.

	Advertise	Be silent
Advertise	3,3	6, 1
Be silent	1, 6	4,4

▶ What will they do?

Prisoners' dilemma: Arms race

- ▶ Two countries are neighbors.
- Each of them may choose to develop a new weapon:
 - ► If one does so while the other one keep the current status, the former's payoff is 20 and the latter's payoff is -100.
 - If both do this, however, their payoffs are both -10.

	MW	CS
MW	-10, -10	20, -100
\mathbf{CS}	-100, 20	0,0

▶ What will they do?

Predicting the outcome of other games

- ▶ How about games that are not the prisoners' dilemma? Do we have a systematic way to predict the outcome?
- ▶ What will be the outcome (a combination of actions chosen by the two players) of the following game?

	Left	Middle	Right
Up	1, 0	1, 2	0, 1
Down	0, 3	0, 1	2, 0

Eliminating strictly dominated options

- We may apply the same trick we used to solve the prisoners' dilemma.
- ► For player 2, playing Middle **dominates** playing Right. So we may **eliminate** the column of Right without eliminating any possible outcome:

Left Middle Right			Left	Middle
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c } \hline Up & & 1,0 & 1,2 & 0,1 \\ \hline \end{array}$	\rightarrow	Up	1, 0	1,2
$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Down	0, 3	0, 1

Eliminating strictly dominated options

- ▶ Now, player 1 knows that player 2 will never play Right.
- ▶ Facing the reduced game, player 1 finds that playing Down is dominated by playing Up.
- ▶ The row of Down can thus be eliminated:

Left Middle		Left Middle
Up $\begin{vmatrix} 1,0 \end{vmatrix}$ 1,2	\rightarrow	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
Down $ 0,3 0,1$		Op 1,0 1,2

- ▶ Knowing that player 1 will only choose Up, player 2 will simply choose Middle.
- ▶ The outcome of this game will be that player 1 chooses Up and player 2 chooses Middle.

Eliminating strictly dominated options

- ▶ In game theory, options are typically called **strategies**.
- The above idea is called <u>iterative elimination</u> of strictly dominated strategies.
- ▶ It solves some games. However, is also fails to solve some others.
- ► Consider the following game "Matching pennies":

 $\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline Head & Tail\\ \hline Head & 1, -1 & -1, 1\\ \hline Tail & -1, 1 & 1, -1 \end{tabular}$

- ▶ What may we do when no more strategies can be eliminated?
- ► In 1950, John Nash formalized the concept of equilibrium solutions, which are called Nash equilibria nowadays.¹

¹He did that as a Ph.D. students, when he was 21 years old.

Operations Research, Spring 2013 – Game Theory: Static Games (Part 1) – Nash equilibrium

Road map

- ► Introduction.
- ▶ Nash equilibrium.
- Retailer competitions.

Operations Research, Spring 2013 - Game Theory: Static Games (Part 1) └─Nash equilibrium

Nash equilibrium: definition

▶ The most fundamental equilibrium concept, Nash equilibrium, is defined as follows:

Definition 1

For an n-player game, let S_i be player i's action space and u_i be player i's utility function, i = 1, ..., n. An action profile $(s_1^*, ..., s_n^*), s_i^* \in S_i$, is a Nash equilibrium if

$$u_i(s_1^*, \dots, s_{i-1}^*, s_i^*, s_{i+1}^*, \dots, s_n^*) \ge u_i(s_1^*, \dots, s_{i-1}^*, s_i, s_{i+1}^*, \dots, s_n^*)$$

for all $s_i \in S_i$, i = 1, ..., n.

• In other words, s_i^* solves

$$\max_{s_i \in S_i} \quad u_i(s_1^*, ..., s_{i-1}^*, s_i, s_{i+1}^*, ..., s_n^*).$$

Nash equilibrium: an example

 Consider the following game in which no strategy/action is strictly dominated:

	L	\mathbf{C}	R
Т	0,4	4, 0	5, 3
M	4,0	0, 4	5, 3
В	3,5	3, 5	6, 6

- ▶ What is a Nash equilibrium?
 - ▶ (T, L) is not: Player 1 will deviate to M or B.
 - ▶ (T, C) is not: Player 2 will deviate to L or R.
 - ▶ (B, R) is: No one will unilaterally deviate.
 - ▶ Any other Nash equilibrium?

Nash equilibrium as a solution concept

	$\mid L \mid$	C	R
Т	0, 4	4,0	5,3
Μ	4, 0	0,4	5,3
В	3, 5	3,5	6, 6

- ▶ In a static game, a Nash equilibrium is a reasonable outcome.
 - ▶ Imagine that the players play this game **repeatedly**.
 - If they happen to be in a Nash equilibrium, no one has the incentive to unilaterally deviate, i.e., to change her action while all others keep their actions.
 - If they do not, at least one will deviate. This process will continue until a Nash equilibrium is reached.
- ▶ For example, if they starts at (T, L), eventually they will stop at (B, R), the unique Nash equilibrium of this game.

Nash equilibrium: More examples

► Is there any Nash		Denial Confession		
	equilibrium of the prisoners' dilemma?	Denial	-1, -1	-9,0
	dilemma:	Confession	$\begin{vmatrix} 0, -9 \end{vmatrix}$	-6, -6
	Is there any Nash equilibrium of the game		Bach	Stravinsky
"BoS"? ► Battle of sexes.		Bach	2, 1	0,0
	Battle of sexes.Bach or Stravinsky.	Stravinsky	0,0	1,2
			Head	Tail
•	Is there any Nash equilibrium of the matching pennies game?	Head	1, -1	-1,1
		Tail	-1,1	1, -1

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Road map

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Cournot Competition

- ► In 1838, Antoine Cournot introduced the following quantity competition between two retailers.
- Let q_i be the production quantity of firm i, i = 1, 2.
- Let P(Q) = a − Q be the market-clearing price for an aggregate demand Q = q₁ + q₂.
- Unit production cost of both firms is c < a.
- Our questions are:
 - ▶ In this environment, what will these two firms do?
 - ▶ Is the outcome satisfactory?
 - ▶ What is the difference between duopoly and monopoly (or equivalently, decentralization or integration).

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Cournot Competition

- ▶ Players: 1 and 2.
- Action spaces: $S_i = [0, \infty)$ for i = 1, 2.
- Utility functions:

$$u_i(q_1, q_2) = q_i[a - (q_i + q_{3-i}) - c], i = 1, 2.$$

- ▶ As for an outcome, we look for a Nash equilibrium.
- If (q_1^*, q_2^*) is a Nash equilibrium, it must satisfy

$$\max_{\substack{q_1 \in [0,\infty)}} u_1(q_1, q_2^*) = q_1[a - (q_1 + q_2^*) - c] \text{ and}$$
$$\max_{\substack{q_2 \in [0,\infty)}} u_2(q_1^*, q_2) = q_2[a - (q_1^* + q_2) - c].$$

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Solving the Cournot competition

▶ For firm 1's problem, we first see that it is a convex program:

•
$$u_1'(q_1, q_2^*) = a - q_1 - q_2^* - c - q_1$$

- $u_2''(q_1, q_2^*) = -2 < 0.$
- ▶ The FOC condition suggests $q_1^* = \frac{1}{2}(a q_2^* c)$. As long as $q_2^* < a c$, q_1^* is optimal for firm 1.
- ▶ Similarly, $q_2^* = \frac{1}{2}(a q_1^* c)$ is firm 2's optimal decision as long as $q_1^* < a c$.
- ▶ So if (q_1^*, q_2^*) is a Nash equilibrium, it must satisfy


$$q_1^* = \frac{1}{2}(a - q_2^* - c)$$
 and $q_2^* = \frac{1}{2}(a - q_1^* - c).$

- The unique solution to this system is $q_1^* = q_2^* = \frac{a-c}{3}$.
 - Does this solution make sense?
 - ▶ This is indeed the unique Nash equilibrium as $\frac{a-c}{3} < a-c$.

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Best responses

- Another way of solving this game is to use the best response functions.
 - Given the other player's any decision, what is my optimal decision?
- Firm 1's best response to firm 2 is $R_1(q_2) = \frac{1}{2}(a - q_2 - c).$
- Similarly, firm 2's best response is $R_2(q_1) = \frac{1}{2}(a - q_1 - c)$.
- ► A Nash equilibrium always lies on an **intersection** of the two best response functions.



Distortion due to decentralization

- Suppose the two firms' are integrated together to jointly choose the aggregate production quantity.
- ► They together solve

$$\max_{Q \in [0,\infty)} Q[a - Q - c],$$

whose optimal solution is $Q^* = \frac{a-c}{2}$.

- Note that $Q^* = \frac{a-c}{2} < \frac{2(a-c)}{3} = q_1^* + q_2^*$.
- ▶ Why does a firm intend to **increase** its production quantity under decentralization?

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Inefficiency due to decentralization

- ▶ May these firms improve their profitability with integration?
- \blacktriangleright Under decentralization, firm *i* earns

$$\pi_i^D = \frac{(a-c)}{3} \left[a - \frac{2(a-c)}{3} - c \right] = \left(\frac{a-c}{3} \right) \left(\frac{a-c}{3} \right) = \frac{(a-c)^2}{9}.$$

▶ Under integration, the two firms earn

$$\pi^{C} = \frac{(a-c)}{2} \left[a - \frac{a-c}{2} - c \right] = \left(\frac{a-c}{2} \right) \left(\frac{a-c}{2} \right) = \frac{(a-c)^{2}}{4}.$$

► $\pi^C > \pi_1^D + \pi_2^D$: The integrated system is more **efficient**.

- ▶ Through appropriate profit splitting, both firm earns more.
 - Integration is a win-win solution!

Inefficiency due to decentralization

- ▶ How about consumers?
- ► Under decentralization, the aggregate quantity is ^{2(a-c)}/₃ and the market-clearing price is ^{a-c}/₃.
- ▶ Under integration, the aggregate quantity is $\frac{a-c}{2}$ and the market-clearing price is $\frac{a-c}{2}$.
- ▶ Under decentralization, **more** consumers buy this product with a **lower** price.
- ► Consumers benefits from competition.
- ▶ Integration benefits the firms but hurts consumers.

The two firms' prisoners' dilemma

- ▶ Now we know it is the two firms' best interests to together produce $Q = \frac{a-c}{2}$.
- What if we suggest each of them to choose $q'_1 = q'_2 = \frac{a-c}{4}$?
- ▶ This results in $Q = \frac{a-c}{2}$, which maximizes the total profit.
- ▶ However, this is **not** a Nash equilibrium:
 - "If the other firm chooses $q' = \frac{a-c}{4}$, I will move to

$$q'' = R(q') = \frac{1}{2}(a - q' - c) = \frac{3(a - c)}{8}.$$

So both firms will have incentives to unilaterally deviate.These two firms are engaged in a prisoners' dilemma!

Bertrand competition

- In 1883, Joseph Bertrand considered another format of retailer competition: They choose prices instead of quantities.
- Firm *i* chooses price p_i , i = 1, 2.
- Firm i's demand quantity is

$$q_i = a - p_i + bp_{3-i}, i = 1, 2.$$

- ▶ $b \in [0, 1)$ measures the **intensity of competition** is: The larger b, the more intense the competition.
- Why b < 1?
- Unit production cost c < a.

Solving the Bertrand competition

- ▶ Suppose (p_1^*, p_2^*) is a Nash equilibrium.
- For firm 1, p_1^* must be an optimal solution of

$$\max_{p_1 \in [0,\infty)} \pi_1(p_1, p_2^*) = (a - p_1 + bp_2^*)(p_1 - c).$$

It can be verified that $p_1^* = \frac{1}{2}(a + bp_2^* + c)$.

- Similarly, $p_2^* = \frac{1}{2}(a + bp_1^* + c)$.
- ► The unique Nash equilibrium is $p_1^* = p_2^* = \frac{a+c}{2-b}$.
 - Does this solution make sense?

Distortion due to decentralization

 Under integration, the two firms together choose a single price P to solve

$$\max_{P \in [0,\infty)} 2(a - P + bP)(P - c),$$

whose optimal solution P^* satisfies the FOC

$$(-1+b)(P^*-c) + a - P^* + bP^* = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (-1+b)P^* + a + c(1-b) = 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow P^* = \frac{a + c(1-b)}{2(1-b)}.$$

• Is $P^* > p_1^* = p_2^*$?

$$P^* > p_1^* \Leftrightarrow \frac{a+c(1-b)}{2(1-b)} > \frac{a+c}{2-b} \Leftrightarrow a > c(1-b).$$

Is a > c(1-b) always true?